



## COMBINED FIRE AUTHORITY

25 FEBRUARY 2020

## GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY: PHASE 1 REPORT

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### REPORT OF ASSISTANT CHIEF FIRE OFFICER SERVICE DELIVERY

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#### Purpose of Report

1. The purpose of this report is to brief Members on the contents and recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report and associated implications for County Durham and Darlington Fire and Rescue Service (CDDFRS).

#### Background

2. In the early hours of 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in the kitchen of Flat 16 Grenfell Tower, a high-rise residential building in North Kensington, West London. Kitchen fires are not uncommon and in terms of its origin and initial magnitude this one appeared reasonably normal. However, the fire, which should have been contained within the confines of Flat 16, spread via the kitchen window to the external envelope of the building.
3. Firefighters from the London Fire Brigade (LFB) attended the fire and within minutes of their arrival had extinguished the fire within the kitchen of Flat 16, but by that time, the fire had already spread into the external cladding where they were unable to fight it successfully. Once established within the cladding, the fire spread up the outside of the building quickly engulfing most of the tower block. The fire subsequently claimed the lives of 71 people who were present in the tower that night.
4. The morning after the fire, the Prime Minister announced that there would be a public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the fire. On 28 June 2017, The Rt. Hon. Sir Martin Moore-Bick was appointed to act as its chairman.
5. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report was published on 30 October 2019, with full access to the document located here:

[Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report](#)

6. Phase 2 of the enquiry involves investigating the underlying causes of the tragedy.

#### Overview of the Inquiry: Phase 1 Report

7. The first report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry is divided into six parts. Part I contains a broad introduction to the events that took place during the early hours of 14 June 2017. It contains a description of Grenfell Tower itself and of the organisation of (LFB).
8. Part II contains a detailed narrative account of the fire and the steps taken in response to it.

9. Part III contains The Rt. Hon. Sir Martin Moore-Bick's conclusions about the origin and development of the fire and his analysis of the response of the LFB and the other emergency services which attended the incident.
10. A summary of the tributes paid to their loved ones by their families and friends is contained in Part IV.
11. Part V contains recommendations arising out of the findings made earlier in the report.
12. Part VI looks ahead to identify some matters of particular importance on which the Inquiry will concentrate its attention in Phase 2.

## **Findings**

13. The Phase 1 Inquiry identified 46 recommendations which are based entirely on evidence heard in relation to issues investigated during this phase and the findings and conclusions reached in the report. The recommendations have regard to making a significant contribution to the safety of people who live in high rise residential buildings.

## **CDDFRS / National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) Actions**

14. In England and Wales, high rise buildings have conventionally been defined, for the purposes of fire safety, as buildings of 18 metres in height or above. Although CDDFRS does not have any high-rise residential buildings within its Service area, CDDFRS' Operational Assurance Group (OAG) has considered the recommendations with regard to improvement of local plans, policies, procedures and training.
15. The NFCC Central Programme Office is co-ordinating a national response to the recommendations made by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report. This work will support the local work of the OAG to assure the Service of an effective response.
16. An initial analysis of the 46 recommendations using a Strategic Improvement Model has been undertaken by the NFCC. This analysis has proposed strategic level solutions for each of the recommendations and these proposed solutions are detailed against each of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations in Appendix A. The OAG will consider all national solutions to improve the Service's local response.

## **Recommendations**

17. Members are requested to:
  - a. **note** the contents of this report;
  - b. **receive** further reports as appropriate.

## Appendix A

No.	Grenfell Tower Inquiry Recommendation	NFCC Strategic Level Solution
Fire and Rescue Services (FRS): knowledge and understanding of materials used in high-rise buildings		
1	That the owner and manager of every high-rise residential (HRRB) building be required by law to provide their local FRS with information about the design of its external walls together with details of the materials of which they are constructed and to inform the FRS of any material changes made to them.	National Review of risk information gathering, accessibility and enforcement
2	That all FRS ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to fire protection
Section 7(2)d of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004		
3	That the LFB review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in GRA 3.2.	Implementation of NOG and JESIP
4	That the LFB ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to fire protection
5	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law: to provide their local FRS with up-to-date plans in both paper and electronic form of every floor of the building identifying the location of key fire safety systems.	Guidance from Government on National Policy
6	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to ensure that the building contains a premises information box, the contents of which must include a copy of the up-to-date floor plans and information about the nature of any lift intended for use by the FRS.	Guidance from Government on National Policy
7	Insofar as it is not already the case, that all FRS be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.	National Review of risk information gathering, accessibility and enforcement
Lifts		
8	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to carry out regular inspections of any lifts that are designed to be used by firefighters in an emergency and to report the results of such inspections to their local FRS at monthly intervals.	Guidance from Government on National Policy
9	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to carry out regular tests of the mechanism which allows firefighters to take control of the lifts and to inform their local FRS at monthly intervals that they have done so.	Guidance from Government on National Policy

Communication between the control room and the incident commander		
10	That the LFB review its policies on communications between the control room and the incident commander.	Clarified fire control room operations
11	That all officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
12	That all Control Room Operators (CROs) of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Control Room operations, requirements and competency
13	That a dedicated communication link be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander.	Clarified fire control operations
Emergency calls		
14	That the LFB's policies be amended to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
15	That the LFB provide regular and more effective refresher training to CROs at all levels, including supervisors.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Control Room operations, requirements and policy
16	That all FRS develop policies for handling a large number of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls simultaneously.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
17	That electronic systems be developed to record FSG information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
18	That policies be developed for managing a transition from "stay put" to "get out".	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
19	That control room staff receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP

20	That steps be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
21	That the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify FSG calls (as defined by the LFB) and pass them to the LFB as soon as possible.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
Command and Control		
22	That the LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
23	That the LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
24	That the LFB develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
25	That the LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
Equipment		
26	That the LFB urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
27	That urgent steps be taken to ensure that the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use.	Review of incident ground communications and technology
Evacuation		
28	That the government develop national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuation.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
29	Evacuations of HRRB, such guidelines to include the means of protecting fire exit routes and procedures for evacuating persons who are unable to use the stairs in an emergency, or who may	Fire standard underpinned by guidance relating to

	require assistance (such as disabled people, older people and young children).	Incident Command and JESIP.
30	That FRS develop policies for partial and total evacuation of HRRB and training to support them.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
31	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to draw up and keep under regular review evacuation plans, copies of which are to be provided in electronic and paper form to their local FRS and placed in an information box on the premises.	Guidance from Government on National Policy.
32	That all HRRB (both those already in existence and those built in the future) be equipped with facilities for use by FRS enabling them to send an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building by means of sounders or similar devices.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
33	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or cognition).	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
34	That the owner and manager of every HRRB be required by law to include up-to-date information about persons with reduced mobility and their associated PEEPs in the premises information box.	Maximising opportunities to collaborate on procurement.
Internal signage		
35	That in all high-rise buildings floor numbers be clearly marked on each landing within the stairways and in a prominent place in all lobbies in such a way as to be visible both in normal conditions and in low lighting or smoky conditions.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
36	That the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not it is a high-rise building) be required by law to provide fire safety instructions (including instructions for evacuation) in a form that the occupants of the building can reasonably be expected to understand, taking into account the nature of the building and their knowledge of the occupants.	Guidance from Government on National Policy (evacuation).
Fire doors		
37	That the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not they are high-rise buildings) carry out an urgent inspection of all fire doors to ensure that they comply with applicable legislative standards.	National review of risk information gathering, accessibility and enforcement.
38	That the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not they are high-rise buildings) be required by law to carry out checks at not less than three-monthly intervals to ensure that all fire doors are fitted with effective self-closing devices in working order.	National review of risk information gathering, accessibility and enforcement.

39	That all those who have responsibility in whatever capacity for the condition of the entrance doors to individual flats in HRRB, whose external walls incorporate unsafe cladding, be required by law to ensure that such doors comply with current standards.	National review of risk information gathering, accessibility and enforcement.
Co-operation between emergency services		
40	That the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear that each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Category 1 Responders as soon as possible.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
41	That the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear that on the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
42	That the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear that on the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
43	That the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear that a single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
44	That the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear that a "METHANE" message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency service declaring a Major Incident.	Fire Standard underpinned by guidance relating to Incident Command and JESIP
45	That steps be taken to investigate the compatibility of the LFB systems with those of the MPS and the LAS with a view to enabling all three emergency services' systems to read each other's messages.	Review of incident ground communication and technology
46	That steps be taken to ensure that the airborne datalink system on every NPAS helicopter observing an incident which involves one of the other emergency services defaults to the National Emergency Service user encryption.	Guidance from Government on National Policy